

3. THE SAUDIS INTERPRETED THE MARXIST TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN LAST YEAR AS PART OF A SOVIET-DIRECTED CAMPAIGN TO ENCIRCLE THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA WITH RADICAL REGIMES IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUBVERSION OF THE CONSERVATIVE, OIL-RICH MONARCHIES IN THE AREA. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARXIST COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN ARE SEEN IN RIYADH AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE OIL WEALTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN REPORTED IN MAY 1978 THAT THE AFGHAN COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP A BASE FROM WHICH TO SUBVERT IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN THOUGHT IS AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVE FOR THE SAUDIS WHO SEE [WORDS ILLEG]. REVOLUTION AND MARXIST COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN ARE SEEN IN RIYADH AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE OIL WEALTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN REPORTED IN MAY 1979 THAT THE AFGHAN COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP A [ILLEG] FORM WHICH TO SUBVERT IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN THOUGHT IS AN ADDITIONAL MOTIVE FOR THE SAUDIS, WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS THE DEFENDERS OF ISLAMIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

4. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS RECOGNIZED THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KABUL RELATIVELY SOON AFTER ITS ESTABLISHMENT, THE SAUDI MEDIA WERE AN EARLY CRITIC OF THE NEW AFGHAN REGIME--OFTEN CHARGING IT WITH ANTI-ISLAMIC PRACTICES AND WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. BY EARLY 1979 AFGHAN DISSIDENT LEADERS WERE TRAVELING REGULARLY TO SAUDI ARABIA TO ELICIT SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE. ONE GROUP--THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT--OPENED AN OFFICE IN JIDDA IN LATE 1978. SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS APPARENTLY BEGAN IN EARNEST SOMETIME AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR.

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S E C R E T SECTION 31 OF 32 STATE 266505/81

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TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 914 - OCTOBER 11, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE

PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY

DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM

OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

1. (S) SAUDI ARABIA-AFGHANISTAN REBELS: A CIA ANALYSIS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING: SAUDI ARABIA IS PROVIDING LIMITED FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT TO THE TRIBAL DISSIDENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SAUDI SUPPORT REFLECTS RIYADH'S WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL, WHICH THE SAUDIS VIEW AS A SOVIET-CREATED THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ALL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN. THE LIMITED NATURE OF SAUDI SUPPORT IS IN PART AN INDICATION OF THE SAUDIS' DISENCHANTMENT WITH COVERT OPERATIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL.

2. (S) SAUDI MOTIVATION: THE SAUDIS LONG HAVE HAD FAIRLY GOOD TIES WITH AFGHANISTAN. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY CLOSE TO THE AFGHAN MONARCHY BEFORE IT WAS TOPPLED IN 1973, AND THEY REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH FORMER KING ZAHIR SHAH AND PRINCE ABDUL WALI. PRESIDENT DACUD MADE A PILGRIMAGE TO PECCA SHORTLY BEFORE HIS OVERTHROW AND DEATH IN APRIL 1972, AND THE SAUDIS AGREED TO PROVIDE SOME FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS REGIME.

3. (S/UF) THE SAUDIS INTERPRETED THE MARXIST TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN LAST YEAR AS PART OF A SOVIET-DIRECTED CAMPAIGN TO ENCIRCLE THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA WITH RADICAL REGIMES IN PREPARATION FOR THE SUBVERSION OF THE CONSERVATIVE, OIL-RICH MONARCHIES IN THE AREA. THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MARXIST COUP IN SOUTH YEMEN ARE CITED IN RIYADH AS OTHER PARTS OF THE SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE OIL WEALTH OF THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR IN PAKISTAN REPORTED IN MAY 1979 THAT THE AFGHAN COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE SOVIETS TO DEVELOP A BASE FROM WHICH TO SUPPORT IRAN AND PAKISTAN. THE ISLAMIC NATURE OF THE PRESENT AFGHAN REVOLUTION IS AN OBVIOUS FACTOR FOR THE SAUDIS, WHO SEE THE REVOLUTION AS A DEFENSE OF ISLAMIC VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

4. (C) ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS RECOGNIZED THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN KABUL RELATIVELY SOON AFTER ITS INSTALLMENT, THE SAUDI MEDIA WERE AN EARLY CRITIC OF THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. CONFLICT WITH ANTI-ISLAMIC PRACTICES AND UNDERSTAND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. IN EARLY 1979 AFGHAN DISSIDENT LEADERS WERE TRAVELING FREQUENTLY TO SAUDI ARABIA TO ELICIT SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE. ONE GROUP--THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT--OBTAINED AN OFFICE IN JEDDAH IN LATE 1978. SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS APPARENTLY BEGAN IN EARLY SOME TIME AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR.

5. (C) THE LIMITS OF SAUDI AID: THE LIMITED NATURE OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO THE AFGHANS REFLECTS SEVERAL FACTORS. THE SAUDIS ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE ATTEMPTS TO WITHIN THE AFGHAN DISSIDENT-MOVEMENT AND HAVE TO USE AID AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE GREATER UNITY. THE SAUDIS HAVE TOLD THE VARIOUS AFGHAN LEADERS THAT GREATER COOPERATION AMONG THEM IS A PREREQUISITE FOR GREATER SAUDI AID. THE SAUDIS ALSO MAY BE DISAPPOINTED THAT NOT ENOUGH OF THEIR AID ACTUALLY GOES TO THE INDIGENTS BUT RATHER IS KEPT BY ELITES.

6. (C) THE HALFWAYED NATURE OF SAUDI SUPPORT ALSO REFLECTS SOME DISENCHANTMENT IN RIYADH WITH COVERT FUNDING OF ANTILEFTIST GROUPS. IN THE EARLY AND MID-1970S THE SAUDIS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF ISLAMIC GUERRILLA GROUPS IN SOUTH YEMEN AND THE HORN OF AFRICA. ALTHOUGH THE SAUDIS STILL GIVE THEM SOME AID, THESE GROUPS FAILED TO UNSHAK THE LEFTIST REGIMES THEY OPPOSED. THE SAUDIS WERE ALSO DISAPPOINTED THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO SECURE GREATER WESTERN, ESPECIALLY US, SUPPORT FOR THESE CAUSES.

7. (C) DESPITE THESE DISAPPOINTMENTS, SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN REBELS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE. THE SAUDIS HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY THE REBELS' MILITARY SUCCESSES AND WILL DOUBTLESS ENCOURAGE THEM TO KEEP UP THE GOOD FIGHT FOR ALLAH.

8. (C/D) BLACK LEADERS--HISTADPUT: HISTADPUT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS INVITED A GROUP OF AMERICAN BLACK LEADERS TO ISRAEL AND THAT THE GROUP HAS ACCEPTED. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY BENJAMIN HOOKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE NAACP.

9. (C/D) ARAB SUMMIT: ACCORDING TO RADIO BEIRUT, THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WILL BE CONVENED ON NOVEMBER 17. THE MAJOR ISSUE AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

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12. (C) EGYPT-IRAQ: US INTERESTS SECTION BAGHDAD REPORTS THAT IRAQ APPEARS TO BE MAINTAINING A STRICT SEPARATION BETWEEN POLITICAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS DEALINGS WITH EGYPT. THE IRAQI UNIVERSITIES AND SCHOOLS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE NOT ONLY RENEWED THE ANNUAL CONTRACTS OF SOME 2,000 EGYPTIAN TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS, BUT ALSO AIN HELWAN UNIVERSITY HAS HIRED AN ADDITIONAL 300 EGYPTIAN PROFESSORS FOR THIS ACADEMIC YEAR. RECRUITMENT OF EGYPTIAN LABORERS HAS ALSO CONTINUED UNABATED. AT THE SAME TIME EGYPT IS CONTINUALLY ATTACKED BY THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND PRESS.

11. (U) IRAN-SYRIA-BAGHDAD: THE PANAMA OFFICE NEWS AGENCY REPORTED THE ARRIVAL OF THE SYRIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND THE IRANIAN VICE PRIME MINISTER ON OCTOBER 10 AS ENVOYS OF SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD AND IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. THEY MET WITH THE BAKHTIARI PRIME MINISTER AND DISCUSSED UNDISCLOSED TOPICS.

12. (U) EGYPT-SYRIA: ON OCTOBER 12 THE CAIRO PRESS HIGHLIGHTED THE CONTINUING TURMOIL IN SYRIA AND PREDICTED THAT CIVIL WAR WAS IMMINENT BECAUSE OF ASSAD'S INABILITY TO CURB VIOLENCE AND SECTARIAN DISTURBANCES.

14. (C) JORDAN-PLO: EMBASSY AMMAN REPORTED ON OCTOBER 9 THAT A JORDANIAN-PLO DELEGATION LED BY THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND A PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL MEMBER WILL TRAVEL WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK TO LIBYA AND ALGERIA TO PRESS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY PLEDGED AT THE 1978 BAGHDAD CONFERENCE. THE FUNDS ARE TO BE USED TO SUPPORT PLO EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE "STEADFASTNESS" OF THE INHABITANTS OF ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. LIBYA AND ALGERIA ARE THE ONLY COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT FULFILLED THEIR PLEDGE.

14. (U) REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN LATE 1964.

15. (U) REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN LATE 1964.

16. (U) REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN LATE 1964.

17. (U) REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN LATE 1964.

18. (U) REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, OF THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN LATE 1964.